Philosophy and the Solace of Self

Nowhere is there a more idyllic spot, a vacation home more private and peaceful, than in one's own mind, especially when it is furnished in such a way that the merest inward glance induces ease. . .

–Marcus Aurelius, Meditations. IV.3

To what might one owe peace of mind? To a hard day's work or the satisfaction of a job well done? To feats and victories, heroism and valor? To the forbearance of suffering and endurance throughout the languish of pain? To piety and devotion? As the Epicureans said, might it simply be the avoidance of all such pains and extremes?

Though Aristotle's advice might seem the most obvious it is in fact the most difficult: to do the right thing, in the right measure, at the right time, always. And that one's happiness is ever the balance of pleasure derived from one's present task, received from past deeds, and expected  from future ones. Surely anyone who has read what Aristotle expected from a man might see such a task as positively Herculean. To do so one would have to be responsible for ever moment of his life, to have lived each moment at least as best as he was able. Or at least to have redeemed one moment's failure with another's success.

One must of course possess a relentlessly introspective nature. It is not enough merely to do, but one must assess. Worse still, one must do and assess in moderation, not ever yielding to passive torpidity or unguided exuberance.

This virtue of moderation so praised by long gone cultures, cultures who praised the man both musician and astronomer, who tilled the earth and tweaked poetry, is not so much valued today as specialization. Yet how would the main whose intellectual facilities are developed at great disproportion to his mastery of his self react to the temptations of the body, the rights of the condemned, or the uncertainties of philosophy? One need not look far to find brilliant scientists with eggshell philosophy, or  lofty, ivory-tower intellectuals who could not arbitrate the case of a lost dog without caucus and a dissertation on metaphysics.

It follows then that one must have a moral code against which to judge one's actions but this guarantees little peace of mind. No one is born with a fully formed moral system and whose does not change, at least a little, over time? Thus at the end of one's life one is bound to see some misdeeds, yet those same misdeeds may have spurred the creation of the new moral view. There is no escaping the function of time on happiness.

At many points in his life a man will find himself at a crossroads considering the man he has become and the man he hopes himself one day to be. At those points he will have much to consider. First and foremost he will be limited by his intellectual ability and desire for self-criticism. Perhaps most integrally of all, should he lack either of these I scarcely imagine he would realize it. Such a man, philosophy's exile, deserves the pity of all other men. Who is deaf to Plato's timeless call to, "γνῶθι σεαυτόν" and the endless questions and conundrums unleashed by Plato's prompt holds never the world in a grain of sand but ever is held within the limits of his myopia.

What might the balance of these innumerable variables look like? Aristotle and Marcus point the way, though not nearly so precisely as we would hope. What is expected of man is nothing less than the reconciliation of past, present, and future. To relish in the contradiction of man's inescapable indignity and his supernal potential. To form in the self the eclectic communion of the dignitaries of humanity and the peerless spark of the individual. To make the man neither rationalistic automaton nor gross id. To relish every grasp of the flesh and every glimpse of the divine. To say to oneself, "far have I come, far must I go, but gladly." To relish the journey, the destination, and the contradiction. To look back on every grace as undeserved and service as unrequired. To be steward, supplicant, and king; brother, friend, son, father, and foe. To be creature of Prometheus and child of God.

Yet finding solace in the self is not simply an act of moderation between the extremes of opposing philosophical schools. Rather it is the act of moderation between self and other. What is most obviously the great challenge of political life, the balance of individuality and community, is less often seen in the context of developing a character, a character neither ex nihilo nor pastiche, neither alien to other men nor subsumed into group-think. To have knowledge not encyclopedic for the sake of knowing, but catholic for the sake of understanding and living. To make of one's mind not a computer calculating conditionals but a retreat fashioned with the furniture of a lifetime of learning–furniture new and old, sometimes shuffled around, maybe re-finished, and maybe built yourself if you're lucky. To be eclectic not as affectation but as the expression of a curious and uncommon character. What's in your room? Does it clamor with the croaking frogs of Aristophanes and the eternal laughter of Mozart?

Yet happiness is not just being able to close your eyes and watch Achilles fight the Scamander or sit with Bertram Wooster in the garden, but to be content with one's deeds. Not just with heroic feats and discoveries, but in what you have shared with others, with family, coworkers, friends, and acquaintances. Retreat to a room quirky and quiet, but not empty. Retreat, but only to live. Retreat to a mind, as Marcus says, neither "lavish nor crude," neither preoccupied with the machinations of thought nor swept up in the urgencies of whim.

Craft this self not obsessively or relentlessly but with prudence and patience. Craft a self that knows self and other, that is in time and timeless. It's beginning will be its end, so from one philosopher and time to another, know thyself. Remember the rose garden. Through time time conquer, and betwixt past and future, dance. This mind, this presencing self, this world weaving through worlds and time. . .

Nowhere is there a more idyllic spot, a vacation home more private and peaceful. . .

–Marcus Aurelius, Meditations. IV.3

A Presidential Speech: Worthy of Marble?

Demosthenes.

Rhetoric is among the oldest and most venerated of Western traditions. The ability to express yourself well and persuade your audience has been the mark of a great man since Achilles railed against Agamemnon. Training in the rhetorical arts has formed the center of all education for just as long. History is decorated with the speeches of great orators and literature with their speeches. Some of these men were great and laudable, others great and terrible. All wielded considerable political power. Beyond a doubt Demosthenes and Cicero dominate the field of orators and their speeches all rhetorical works.  Likewise Aristotle's On Rhetoric and Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria hold prime place amongst treatises on the craft.  Against these men and works all other speakers and speeches are judged.

Now it would be legitimate to compare any speech to one from Cicero and Demosthenes and to see how it measures up to Aristotle's or Quintilian's standards but it would also be more than a little obtuse and less than a perfect indication of the speaker's success. We must, then, have two criteria: the quality of the speech and the success of the speaker. A perfect speech does not exist in a vacuum rather it must be tailored both to the intended audience and the speaker as a line of dialogue in a film is suited both to the character who speaks it and the audience to whom it is meant to affect. The actor Satyrus educated Demosthenes himself on this point by having the aspiring orator recite a poem and then reciting it himself, attuned to the context of the character and situation. Plutarch relates a story in which Demosthenes, when asked about the most important aspects of oratory, replied, "Delivery, delivery, and delivery."

A speech then is appropriate to the speaker, the audience, and the occasion. We ought to pause and reflect on the audience for a moment. Assuming as we do that the author of the speech (and we must separate the speaker from the speechwriter since some great writers like Lysias wrote for others) is a great writer and the speaker a great speaker we must assume that what they offer is what they think will persuade the audience. Should a speech be elevated or plain, original or traditional, complex or simple, we must assume the speaker thinks such will please the audience. A speech, then, distinctly reveals the speaker's opinion of his audience.

Cicero denouncing Catiline

Today's speechwriter carries a heavy burden, then, but it is in fact heavier still since he must consider not only the Classical speeches and treatises, the speaker, the occasion, and the audience, but all famous speeches throughout literature, from Homer to Shakespeare.  Too he must consider modern political speeches from Washington to Churchill.

Thus when a modern speech is referred to as "worthy of marble"[1] we might grow curious: the speech in question, the 2009 Inaugural Address, must be extraordinary. Such praise inspired me to be especially critical since such a statement starts to step on the toes of dear Demosthenes and Cicero. At times we may appear to be too critical, but some speeches can stand up to such criticism thus I don't think it unreasonable to subject a highly-regarded modern speech to the same standards.

I would note that I won't be commenting on the truth of statements though we may reflect on interesting turns of logic as means of persuasion. I decided to look at this  speech only because of the praise lavished upon the President as an orator and on this speech in particular. As such, this analysis is not meant to be a commentary on the President in any way other than as an orator. In fact it is as much if not more a reflection on the speechwriter.

Let us take a look, then, line by line.

You can read and listen to the speech here at American Rhetoric.

–

Thank you, thank you.

My fellow citizens:

I stand here today humbled by the task before us, grateful for the trust you've bestowed, mindful of the sacrifices borne by our ancestors. I thank President Bush for his service to our nation, as well as the generosity and cooperation he has shown throughout this transition.

A fairly standard "thank you."

Forty-four Americans have now taken the presidential Oath. The words have been spoken during rising tides of prosperity and the still waters of peace. Yet, every so often the Oath is taken amidst gathering clouds and raging storms. At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents.

He establishes the continuity of government and society with, "forty-four Americans" and "forbearers" and "founding documents." Some of this seems a little clunky and repetitive: "have now taken," "have been spoken," "has carried," and "have remained faithful."  The phrase "Have now taken" has set him on an awkward path to maintain consistency. The tidal and storm comparisons are simple and cliché. He appeals to the people as being one of them, distancing himself from the fact that he occupies a "high office."

So it has been. So it must be with this generation of Americans.

"So it has been. So it must be" is much more formal and nearly striking but diminished because the segue is awkward and the segue is awkward because of the tense. The phrases "have been" et cetera keeps us rooted in the present looking at the past. This of course distances us instead. "So it has been" is then parallel. "So it must be" is meant to break the parallelism because the picture of the past is not clearly drawn. Most of the description, in fact, is taken up with weak verbs like "have been" and clichés. Nothing specific has been mentioned. 

That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred.

Another inelegant tense use and phrasing: "that we are in is. . ." and " is now well. . ." Finally the present tense follows. Two features appear again which will dominate the landscape of the speech: a preponderance of commas/pauses and a lack of specifics. The war is "against a network" not against anyone in particular. The distance from the people at war is increased by the fact that he doesn't even use any word for them at all, but merely refers to what they do, "violence" and "hate." Interestingly he uses "far-reaching" which emphasizes their reach but not their strength.

Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age. Homes have been lost; jobs shed; businesses shuttered. Our health care is too costly; our schools fail too many; and each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet.

More inelegance with "is badly weakened." More vagueness follows: some people did something bad and everyone failed to do something else. What does "prepare the nation for a new age" in fact mean? How does it relate to the previous or succeeding thought? The first actual rhetorical devices follow in the form of asyndeton (lack of expected conjunctions): "Homes have been lost; jobs shed; businesses shuttered." He follows with another, hyperbole: "each day brings further evidence." The phrase "that the ways we use" is again inelegant. A very pessimistic paragraph.

These are the indicators of crisis, subject to data and statistics. Less measurable, but no less profound, is a sapping of confidence across our land -- a nagging fear that America's decline is inevitable, that the next generation must lower its sights.

The next sentence treats the last paragraph as an argument: he has established we are in a crisis. "Subject to data and statistics" is a peculiar addition. What does it precisely mean? It sort of implies that the data might suggest a threshold for a crisis, but it is unclear. They function to make what precedes appear quantifiable and practice and what follows to be somehow spiritual. What follows is quite clever. Sapping is visceral and effective here, though the gerundial treatment is too lengthy to achieve a strong, concerted impact. Then we get "decline," really out of nowhere. It is wholly unprepared and we go from "crisis" to "decline." How can the fear be nagging if the fear is new? The fear can only be nagging if the decline is in the past and has been perceived and the crisis is present, yet he seems to be suggesting that the crisis is what would precede the decline (if we don't do what is necessary to avoid it.) It would not make sense to suggest that one has a nagging fear that the country is going to decline at some point in the future at some particular threshold, which would require present indicators of decline which would constitute said decline.

Today I say to you that the challenges we face are real. They are serious and they are many. They will not be met easily or in a short span of time. But know this, America: They will be met.

The direct address is meant to bring him closer to the listener again, to come back to him after all of the frightful talk of crisis and decline.

On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord.

On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn out dogmas, that for far too long have strangled our politics.

This is all quite vague but reveals a few interesting things. First, it is merely an expanded way of saying "you voted for me and my ideas." Second, "On this day we gather" ignores that there were people gathered who did not support him. Here, then, he is only addressing his supporters. He also sets up some strange dichotomies: hope will lead to success and not fear, that having different purposes leads to conflict. These are of course not well-accepted or even intuitive contrasting pairs and he does not argue for them but rather asserts them. None of the "petty grievances" et cetera are named.

We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to "set aside childish things." The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.

"We remain a young nation" is slightly out of place here since he is about to talk about founding documents and of course though the nation is old that it is governed by these same documents and has been for hundreds of years makes it in fact considerably older than many in this respect.

What childish things is he talking about? We went from "faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents" to "put aside childish things." He never names the bad ideas, but goes on to mention the three fundamental freedoms of America slightly modified. Instead of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" we have "all are equal," "freedom," and "full measure of happiness." This is a simple but effective passage, despite the vague "reaffirm."

In reaffirming the greatness of our nation, we understand that greatness is never a given. It must be earned. Our journey has never been one of short-cuts or settling for less. It has not been the path for the faint-hearted -- for those who prefer leisure over work, or seek only the pleasures of riches and fame. Rather, it has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things -- some celebrated but more often men and women obscure in their labor, who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom.

Again there are no specifics. We don't know how we're going to "reaffirm" anything. He uses no specific examples of events, people, places, or professions. There is no distinct picture. It is meant to praise hardworking, non-famous Americans but is vague to the point of being un-affecting. It desperately needs examples, which follow. Yet the fact that they follow makes this paragraph float adrift. We begin to feel the speech lacks a large-scale structure to relate ideas and create a fluidity which carries us through.

For us, they packed up their few worldly possessions and traveled across oceans in search of a new life.

For us, they toiled in sweatshops and settled the West; endured the lash of the whip and plowed the hard earth.

For us, they fought and died, in places like Concord and Gettysburg; Normandy and Khe Sahn.

These sentences are carefully constructed to suggest 1) all Americans are immigrants, 2) to praise both urban and farm workers, 3) praise both farmers and slaves, and 4) a praise all military service. It also sets up a causal relationship of service: they did what they did for us. As we see in many other places, this needs something to persuade us. Perhaps he could have addressed them or utilized an abrupt pause? Might not that have been affecting here?

Time and again these men and women struggled and sacrificed and worked till their hands were raw so that we might live a better life. They saw America as bigger than the sum of our individual ambitions; greater than all the differences of birth or wealth or faction.

Again, we feel like we are being told facts when we should feel like we are being drawn into a narrative. The two parts of the second sentence are not logically connected: they worked hard because they didn't believe in "the differences of birth or wealth or faction?" If delivered in a rapid, excited, or emotional manner it could function an anacolutha, i.e. a breaking off in the structure for dramatic purpose, in this case to enhance the fact that the "differences of birth or wealth or faction" are meaningless and older generations were great and America is great for not considering them. It is also a light polysyndeton (the use of excessive conjunctions.) If delivered straightforward it merely seems a mistake.

This is the journey we continue today. We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth. Our workers are no less productive than when this crisis began. Our minds are no less inventive, our goods and services no less needed than they were last week or last month or last year. Our capacity remains undiminished. But our time of standing pat, of protecting narrow interests and putting off unpleasant decisions - that time has surely passed. Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America.

What journey was that? Carrying forward the "noble idea" and working for the next generation. What follows is an assertion of power and an assertion that America's problem is one of will and not any tangible force. As before, the ill forces are ill-defined.

For everywhere we look, there is work to be done. The state of our economy calls for action, bold and swift, and we will act -- not only to create new jobs, but to lay a new foundation for growth. We will build the roads and bridges, the electric grids and digital lines that feed our commerce and bind us together. We will restore science to its rightful place, and wield technology's wonders to raise health care's quality and lower its cost. We will harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories. And we will transform our schools and colleges and universities to meet the demands of a new age.

All this we can do.

All this we will do.

The opening phrase is effective, the two halves "everywhere we look" and "there is work to be done" of equal syllables. The parallel uses of "we will" emphasizes action with more specifics than before in the speech. The couplet makes concrete the assertions.

Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions -- who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans. Their memories are short. For they have forgotten what this country has already done; what free men and women can achieve when imagination is joined to common purpose, and necessity to courage.

This is an interesting bit of logic. He gathers his critics into one group and says their criticism amounts to being short-sighted and ignorant of American's greatness. This clever turn of logic would have been made much more powerful had he followed with any example. Too it is of interest to note that he cites what the country has done as an example that great things can be done and ascribes the success of those things to imagination and unity but not the actual skill it took to do them (whatever it was.) This is the essential logic of the speech. We will see it play out again later: communism and fascism were defeated not with tanks but alliances. Nuclear dangers will be avoided "with allies."

What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them -- that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply. The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works -- whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified. Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end. And those of us who manage the public's dollars will be held to account -- to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day -- because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government.

More interesting logic here. He again bypasses any negative ideas or criticisms: "they no longer apply" and "the question we ask to day is not. . ." This paragraph is somewhat awkward insofar as it alternates between extremely brief phrases like "programs will end" and a very casual style, "jobs at a decent wage," "care they can afford," ". . . that is dignified," "reform bad habits." These are very familial virtues. The paragraph concludes with an interesting bit of logic: accountability will restore trust. Not virtue or success but accountability.

Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control. The nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous. The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our Gross Domestic Product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on the ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart -- not out of charity, but because it is the surest route to our common good.

This paragraph is unremarkable in terms of style but it contains another interesting bit of logic: it equates spinning out of control with crisis and crisis with favoring only certain people. It too is vague, though, insofar as it doesn't mention the manner in or mechanisms by which anything occurs or has occurred.

As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers -- Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience'[s] sake. And so to all the other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: Know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity. And we are ready to lead once more.

He rejects the dichotomy between safety and ideals, but does not say why. He asserts "We will not give them up for expedience'[s] sake." Who suggested to do so? What exactly is he talking about here? There needs to be something here to persuade. He moves right into the Founding Fathers building off of "ideals." That transition is very smooth but he says "we can scarcely imagine" which is ineffective because he is trying to draw a comparison. We need to imagine, he needs to draw a picture. (See concluding paragraph.) Interestingly he again avoids mention of specific founders or the titles of the documents, "Constitution" and "Declaration on Independence," but refers simply to a charter (with emphasis via a little anaphora.)

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

We see still more pairs of ideas: fascism and communism, missiles and tanks, alliances and convictions. Again too is the "neither. . . nor. . . but rather. . ." construction. It is also interesting to argue that security, security in particular, emanates from righteousness. Does it? Being righteous may make you many things, but secure? Too, why does "prudent use" increase your power? Prudent use might do many things, why this in particular?

The syntax and sense with the clause beginning "instead" is clumsy. We have three sentences, beginning:

• Earlier generations faced down x and y not with a and b but c and d
• They understood neither e nor f was true. . .
• Instead they knew g, h, i, and j.

First, he throws too much out here which makes the paragraph border on being simply a list of assertions. Instead of building the third statement off of the second the sentences should have been kept parallel. The third clause begins "instead" despite the fact that the sense is the same as the preceding sentence, i.e. that earlier generations knew something. It should simply begin, "they knew." Obviously this is not a mistake but rather a deliberate, albeit sloppy, attempt to create a climax. This passage has the material ("earlier generations," "convictions") for a climax (lit. "ladder") and it would have been effective here more strongly to link the ideas. A climax here would have increased tension by provided a clear (and convincing) path from earlier generations to today and suggested the timelessness of the convictions. It should have concluded with "enduring convictions" which would have flowed nicely into the next paragraph.

Instead we have the typical situation of short and thinly connected sentences concluding with the awkward and unseemly, "restraint" (which at least should have been replaced by a steelier word, one more dignified and associated with virtue like "forbearance," "moderation," "reserve," "discipline," et cetera.)

We are the keepers of this legacy. Guided by these principles once more, we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort -- even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people, and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan. With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet. We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you!

This introduction is effective despite the poor preceding climax. "Once more " implies the principles were dropped. This whole paragraph is a much more effective building of tension and climax with smooth transition from sentence to sentence and thought to thought. It is very simple though somewhat heavy on adjectives and adverbs. Interestingly, though, we have gone from, "nor does it entitle us to do as we please" to "We will not apologize for our way of life." Instead of using the word "terrorists" he says, "Those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror." That is a striking circumlocution to avoid the word.

For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus -- and non-believers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.

"For we know" implies a connection to the preceding paragraph which in fact is absent. The strength from being of "patchwork heritage" is a strength, but cannot be the only strength by which the enemy will be defeated. The disconnect is more clear if you remove the pause: we will defeat you because (for) we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength. The "we know" makes the syntax and sense more awkward since it ought to read we will defeat you because (for) our patchwork heritage is a strength. We couldn't defeat them if it were a weakness? Obviously he is trying to say that diversity is a virtue but has struggled to work it in.

He identifies not our present differences but past differences as a strength. Where he once drew distinctions between earlier generations and present, now he uses "we" to describe both: earlier generations faced down fascism and communism but we all tasted the bitter swill of civil war. "Bitter swill" and "shall" are clunky usages designed to make the paragraph feel more grand and formal.

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West -- know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those -- To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to the suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.

He now addresses other groups but does not say much. He offers no judgments of any kind, simply saying they are on the "wrong side" of history. The "fist" image is terribly cliche.

As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages. We honor them not only because they are the guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service; a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves. And yet, at this moment -- a moment that will define a generation -- it is precisely this spirit that must inhabit us all.

More standard images: an unfolding road, far-off deserts, distant mountains. "That" figures so strongly in all of these constructions it now seems a sort of crutch. Why does he use "And yet. . .?" What contrast is implied? Again a simple sentence without some preparatory phrase would have been more effective: This spirit must inhabit us all.

For as much as government can do and must do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies. It is the kindness to take in a stranger when the levees break, the selflessness of workers who would rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job which sees us through our darkest hours. It is the firefighter's courage to storm a stairway filled with smoke, but also a parent's willingness to nurture a child, that finally decides our fate.

Some much needed specific examples if somewhat crudely written. "Willingness to nurture a child" is an odd turn of phrase designed to make the parent's sacrifice seem honorable when in fact it makes it seem optional.

Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we meet them may be new. But those values upon which our success depends -- honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism -- these things are old. These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility -- a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation, and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task.

This is the price and the promise of citizenship.

This is the source of our confidence -- the knowledge that God calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny.

This is the simplest, clearest, most specific, and best passage in the speech (aside from the use of the word "instruments.") It is still somewhat rough, though, as the change of structure from "those values. . ." to "these things" is somewhat cheesy. "What is demanded" is awkward and not vivid enough. This was the prime spot for a striking, defining, image of the "moment that will define a generation."

This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed -- why men and women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent mall, and why a man whose father less than sixty years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred Oath.

This is again a little vague. How can what he just said "mean" liberty? What creed? The first "this is the price" refers to the preceding paragraph. The second refers to the "knowledge that God calls. . ." What does this one refer to? 

So let us mark this day with remembrance, of who we are and how far we have traveled. In the year of America's birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river. The Capitol was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood. At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:

Let it be told to the future world...that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive...that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet [it].

America: In the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children's children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God's grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.

Again, this simple passage is among the best. The images are very traditional, the sentences are very short. It paints a picture which would have been much more effective at the beginning to build on and draw comparisons to rather than to lead up to. It also would have provided a vivid image which would have hovered over the whole speech.

–

Brief Comments

What may we say in general about this speech? 1) it is quite light on figurative language or elaborate syntactical constructions. 2) The periodic length is very short and thus the ideas are easy to follow.  3) There are very few details, examples, or specifics. 3) He does not address critics. 4) There are a lot of weak verbs like "are" and "is" which are lost opportunities to be more specific and more vivid. 5) clauses are heavily dependent on the word "that" for clarity. 6) the vocabulary is limited, simple, common, and bland. 7) There is an overabundance of adjectives.

In particular, the "weak verbs" are problematic since they rob the speech of intensity and variety. Consider the phrase, "they have something to tell us" which is completely indistinct. Perhaps it could have read, "the soldier's sacrifice inspires the civilian. . ." Too "we are ready" might read "we stand ready." "They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history" would be stronger if stated as a truism (the rhetorical term is dilation, i.e. broadening the theme to include universal ideas) and 1) more tersely, 2) in grander fashion, or 3) with an image or example.

1) These private virtues make men–and nations.
2) The world moves not only through grand leaps captured by newspapers and recorded in books but also, more I think, through the silent virtues of decent men.
3) The triumph of today's hero might move the world for an hour, but the unprofitable, unseen, and unknown virtues of Americans move us day by day.

These are a but a few phrases which are bland and difficult to breathe life into.Let us compare this speech to one from the Founding Fathers President Obama mentioned.

George Washington's First Inaugural Address

AMONG the vicissitudes incident to life no event could have filled me with greater anxieties than that of which the notification was transmitted by your order, and received on the 14th day of the present month. On the one hand, I was summoned by my country, whose voice I can never hear but with veneration and love, from a retreat which I had chosen with the fondest predilection, and, in my flattering hopes, with an immutable decision, as the asylum of my declining years—a retreat which was rendered every day more necessary as well as more dear to me by the addition of habit to inclination, and of frequent interruptions in my health to the gradual waste committed on it by time. On the other hand, the magnitude and difficulty of the trust to which the voice of my country called me, being sufficient to awaken in the wisest and most experienced of her citizens a distrustful scrutiny into his qualifications, could not but overwhelm with despondence one who (inheriting inferior endowments from nature and unpracticed in the duties of civil administration) ought to be peculiarly conscious of his own deficiencies. In this conflict of emotions all I dare aver is that it has been my faithful study to collect my duty from a just appreciation of every circumstance by which it might be affected. All I dare hope is that if, in executing this task, I have been too much swayed by a grateful remembrance of former instances, or by an affectionate sensibility to this transcendent proof of the confidence of my fellow-citizens, and have thence too little consulted my incapacity as well as disinclination for the weighty and untried cares before me, my error will be palliated by the motives which mislead me, and its consequences be judged by my country with some share of the partiality in which they originated.

Comparison

1) Varied, [More] Complex, and Vivid Vocabulary: vicissitudes, predilection, immutable, despondence, transcendent, disinclination.
2) Longer Periods: The whole paragraph is only five sentences and is one thought.
3) Specific, Eloquent, and Memorable Turns of Phrase: vicissitudes incident to life, fondest predilection, flattering hopes, immutable decision, asylum of my declining years, the addition of habit to inclination, distrustful scrutiny, overwhelm with despondence, faithful study, grateful remembrance.

The first sentence is a brilliant introduction beginning with a vast concept, "the vicissitudes incident to life" and then inserting himself among them. The following sentence is a poetic and beautiful way of describing the call to service, "I was summoned by my country, whose voice I can never hear but with veneration and love. . ." It is also reminiscent of Demosthenes' First Olynthiac, "The present crisis, Athenians, calls on you, almost with an audible voice" [2]  a passage which President Obama could have quoted nearly verbatim. Washington's opening also is a clear exordium, or introduction, in which he clearly sets out his point with another Demosthenic device, the phrase "on the one hand. . . on the other." He also, a la Demosthenes, nests other clauses within the "one the one hand. . . on the other" structure. Among other virtues, this construction creates a large scale structure which alleviates you from have to make and link many smaller sentences with kludges like "Yet" "every so often," "at these moments" "for. . ." "that we are" which are wasteful insofar as they add nothing, grow wearisome to the ear, and break flow. 

Consider the following passage from Washington's Address:

. . .there is no truth more thoroughly established than that there exists in the economy and course of nature an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness; between duty and advantage; between the genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous policy and the solid rewards of public prosperity and felicity; since we ought to be no less persuaded that the propitious smiles of Heaven can never be expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and right which Heaven itself has ordained; and since the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people.

It is not so different from President Obama's in several respects, is it?

Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we meet them may be new. But those values upon which our success depends -- honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism -- these things are old. These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility -- a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation, and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task.

Washington's passage is one sentence of smoothly rising tension to a climax, building from an asserted universal truth that duty and advantage go together and ending with the ultimate arbiter of success: the American people. His vocabulary is firm: thoroughly established, indissoluble union; bright:magnanimous, prosperity, felicity; and grand: liberty, destiny. He also invokes the sacred with subtlety and elegance not by quoting it but by adopting its vocabulary: Heaven itself, ordained, and sacred fire. The images are also visual: smiles of heaven, fire of liberty. He does not say values as if values may differ, but instead he says truths and thus doesn't have to double back and waste words to add, "these things are true" as President Obama does. What President Obama says obliquely with "What is required," Washington unabashedly ascribes to the divine, "Heaven itself has ordained." For Washington the "destiny of the republican model" is in the people's hands and for Obama the people have "a difficult task."

This passage from President Obama's speech is not at all bad, but its vocabulary is dull and its lack of structure imposes awkward phrases and transitions. Clearly the speech attempts to mimic Washington's in several respects and the last sentence in the selection is not so far from succeeding.

Evaluating the Speech

It seems prudent first to consider what this occasion calls for in a speech. The Presidential Inaugural Address is, to use Aristotle's categories, part political and part epideictic. That is, it is partly concerned with urging a particular course of action and partly concerned with esteeming something. (See Rhetoric I.iii, 1358a.) The speech fails as a political speech on account of its vagueness. It conveys no course of action on which one can deliberate and it does not attempt to persuade. It can be an effective course not to present the ideas of your opponents, as this speech does, but the course you do suggest must be all the more clear. As Aristotle says, (Rhetoric I.ii, 1357a) the duty of rhetoric is to deal with matters for which we have no arts or system so guide us and which seem to present us with alternate possibilities. The job of the speaker is to make clear and appealing a particular course of action. Too, it would rhetorically have been effective to concede a point, perhaps to re-frame it or to use its truth to his advantage, or simply to appear magnanimous.

As a ceremonial speech it is more successful because it praises the American way of life, though as we saw in contrast to Washington's speech it is vague and bland. It is more successful as an epideictic speech when it simply extols the virtues of "loyalty and patriotism" than when it attempts to be grand, e.g. "Guided by these principles once more" "hatreds shall someday pass."

In addition to the fundamental nature of the Inaugural Address we ought to consider the circumstances of January 2009 when it was delivered. Most notable among the circumstances was the economic crisis. Part of any speech delivered that day would be to assure the people that they chose the right president and give them a way forward.

We ought to dwell a bit longer on Aristotle who noted (Rhetoric I.ii) that three modes of persuasion exist: 1) of the personal character of the speaker, 2) putting the audience in a particular frame of mind, 3) proof or apparent proof of the words themselves. We pass over evaluating the first aspect since such would be an overtly and exclusively political analysis. We have also observed that the speech does not address specific points of policy, thus it does not attempt to prove anything (mode 3.) The only mode remaining is that of putting the audience in a frame of mind. The speech certainly seems to be of this nature as it attempts to paint a situation of a new beginning and a fresh start. In this respect the speech's lack of argumentation is not a weakness and it somewhat succeeds in getting the audience to put things out of their minds. For a speech of this nature, though, the lack of attractiveness of the prose and the lack of structure (which would amplify the euphoric feeling it attempts to generate) are severe detriments. It needed to paint two vivid pictures: one of the past and one of the present. The speech did not do this. With such strengths and flaws I cannot see how someone who was not already in favor of President Obama could have been persuaded by the speech. (Consider for yourself "Mode 1" mentioned above.) It simply does not seem designed to win over critics. The plans it presents are not specific enough even to acknowledge as plans, the praise is not specific enough to endear, it is not grand enough to impress, it is not beautiful enough to captivate, and there is no attempt to persuade by argument. Too it does not succeed in developing a clear, plain style, a grand style, or a moderate one.

Aristotle at the opening of the Rhetoric identified the craft as that which utilizes the best of the available means of persuasion. The author of this speech would not seem to have availed himself of the potential means.

It is easier to say whether or not a speech is a good piece of literature than it is to say whether it accomplished its aim. As a piece of literature I think it is clear this speech is competently written but unremarkable, certainly not "worthy of marble." It pales in all respects before the great Classical speeches. It is seen to be rather limited in expression. It clearly expects less of its audience, and offers less, than Washington's.

Before we conclude, though, Demosthenes and Cicero have another lesson to teach us. It concerns evaluating the success of a speech. Both men rather infamously failed in their ultimate political quests, Demosthenes to rally the Greeks to successful opposition against Philip of Macedon and Cicero to prevent the republic from slipping under totalitarian control. The two men were also executed by the political parties which eventually gained power. Thus while their speeches define the form we would be hard pressed to say they were successful. (They did, of course, deliver many successful speeches throughout their careers.)

Was President Obama's Inaugural Speech successful as a political speech? I'll leave that for others to argue. Personally, one might consider the following: What do you remember about it? What did it persuade you of? What did it cause you to do or not do?

Permit me my personal reflection. I read President Obama's inaugural speech, in its entirety, closely and several times in writing this essay. I cannot presently recall the opening paragraph. I can, however, recall with great clarity and accuracy the opening of Demosthenes' 2nd Olynthiac, which begins with a theme not so dissimilar from President Obama's, but which I have not looked at in several years. Demosthenes' speech begins (translated):

On many occasions, men of Athens, one may, I think, recognize the manifest favor of heaven towards our city, and not least at the present crisis.

You may wish to read the speech here at the Perseus Project, which has both the original Greek and an English translation. This opening is a marvel of compression and clarity. The Greek is pleasing to the ear but not distractingly beautiful or poetic. It is perfectly balanced in tone, neither pedestrian nor highfalutin. It moves clearly from the past to the future, not only moving from past fortune to present crisis but also subtly intertwining the ideas. It makes you want to hear the argument to come. That's the power of but one sentence of Demosthenes and that's the standard for being "worthy of marble."

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[1] http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/striking-new-chord
[2] Olynthiac 1.2 at the Perseus Project

On MacIntyre on Capitalism

This essay is a sort of sibling to my previous one, Caution: Intellectual's At Work.

Philosophy in Plato's Apology certainly seems to be very political and indeed it is. There are ideas behind all actions and Socrates' teaching certainly had broad effects. (To make an enormous understatement.) Thus how we act and interact part of political philosophy.  Yet where is the line between political and personal? At what point does someone trying to live a good life become a busybody trying to reorient other people?

I was pondering those questions, and others, after I read this essay on Alasdair MacIntyre in Prospect. It was a curious read for me because I in many was have an Aristotelian outlook on life. So MacIntyre seems to also, and yet we were not as nearly in accord as I would have expected. Let me share some of my concerns.

"MacIntyre yearns for a single, shared view of the good life as opposed to modern pluralism’s assumption that there can be many competing views of how to live well." Is that not a little. . . unnerving to hear? In the other of this pair of essays I mentioned that the intellectual ought to be humbled by the philosophical endeavor and a little reluctant to start reordering society.The administration of justice, to Aristotle, was the principal order of society, not a consensus on how one ought to live.

Such is a problem with intellectuals, that they are so intelligent they don't see the bounds of what they can and ought to do. Likewise, they seek perfectly logical systems of belief, at the expense of whether something is likely to work and often in contrast to observation. Hence the extraordinarily immoderate ideas of many highly intelligent people. Such would not be so problematic if they did not lend their stamp of authority on highly dangerous figures and movements. Such is not to say consistency is not laudable, but that it may have a price. The author reports one of MacIntyre's ideas in a very Aristotelian phrase, "The telos for human beings is to generate a communal life with others." Of course living with others is natural, but it is too easy to misread this phrase as, "because one lives (and must live) with others that one lives only to live with others" which is rather off base. (This may be an awkward paraphrasing of MacIntyre, I suspect.)

Too, today the word modernity is invoked as a buzzword to summon up images of industrialization, pop music, and kids who don't read listening to iPods.  This sort of association is not unlike the association between the word "factory" and images of sooty stone buildings with Mr. Moneybags taking advantage of child labor. (Modern medicine, modern online libraries, and the like don't get much praise.) This cliché is wearing tenuously thin. If one has a particular idea to critique, do so.

Wearing thin with me also is the tendency of people to use the word capitalism without defining it. The word is usually used to mean something tantamount to "something bad involving money." It is used nine times in this essay and we have no remote, let alone satisfactory, definition of it. 

The economics he describes, or at least how it is presented, is also particularly confused.

Take the following example:

For workers are also consumers and capitalism requires consumers with the purchasing power to buy its products. So there is tension between the need to keep wages low and the need to keep consumption high. Capitalism has solved this dilemma, MacIntyre says, by bringing future consumption into the present by dramatic extensions of credit.

Not quite and not having defined capitalism, understanding this paragraph is problematic. How does capitalism require anything? You don't have to buy anything. If there is demand for something, someone might create the product to meet the demand. If not, the productive capacity will go to produce something else. I suppose in theory if you couldn't produce anything that anyone wanted, you could just support yourself farming. What MacIntyre is in fact against is mainstream Keynesian economics. This economics, now offered up as our saving grace by certain economic big wigs, relies on buying for the sake of buying just to get demand up. (An absurd notion since people don't buy just anything, they don't by globs of GDP by products they need.) The asset bubbles created by the government were created, in part, under the assumption that you could continuously engineer growth and have an everlasting rise in values. The government, not only "people behaving badly," created the easy credit which made taking risks (which at any other time would have been regulated and rendered impossible by a market) possible.

He continues,

This expansion of credit, he goes on, has been accompanied by a distribution of risk that exposed to ruin millions of people who were unaware of their exposure. So when capitalism once again overextended itself, massive credit was transformed into even more massive debt. . .

What imperative exactly is he implying here? First, that you have a responsibility to disclose something of the risk to the borrower. This sounds very nice, but how do you actually ensure someone understands something? They sign the paperwork, they nod. You could explain it perfectly clearly and still not be sure they knew what they were getting into. Second, he is implying that the borrower does not have the responsibility to figure this out for himself.

Moving on,

Not only does capitalism impose the costs of growth or lack of it on those least able to bear them, but much of that debt is unjust. And the “engineers of this debt,” who had already benefited disproportionately, “have been allowed to exempt themselves from the consequences of their delinquent actions.”

Indeed, but that only happens if you force people to pay back the debt of others. If the only people affected are the lender and the borrower, no one else is implicated. This is an issue of the "debt engineers" having corrupted the members of the government, i.e. the people with the monopoly on the law, and "persuaded" them to force citizens to pay back the debt.

Oddly, he proposes regulation but according to this article does not consider his proposals "regulation." Yet when he writes that, "since regulations merely 'have as their aim the prevention of further large-scale crises' he is in a sense correct because the regulations, like his own non-regulation regulations, seek to put managing the economy in to the hands of elites instead of allowing individuals to manage their own affairs and assess risk for themselves.

The question again, as we have discussed before, is where does discipline and order come from? MacIntyre properly faults the "capitalism" of the government-run sort, but would replace it with his non-regulation regulations. The distributist model discussed in the article is likewise statist by nature.  

Overall, the economic thinking in this essay is lamentably muddled. (As presented, the association between "money-trading" (another vague term) and inequality is so thin I can't even critique it.) In a way this is unsurprising, since as Jesus Huerta de Soto demonstrated in his essay, "Economic Thought in Ancient Greece" [1] philosophers seem unable or unwilling to consider economics as a separate discipline. They're also, though often admittedly, not concerned with liberty. What is not admitted is that in a free economy, one not managed by the government, you wouldn't have to fear the debasement of your money and you wouldn't have to engage in any kid of activity you don't want to.

Virtue in Aristotle is in fact a most complicated notion and discussing it also requires familiarity with his logical books. Discussing the political aspects requires familiarity with nearly of Aristotle. In Aristotle virtue is a complex of innate desire and conscious action, inducement and freedom, nature and cultivation. It is impossible to speak about it glibly and do it any justice.

Perhaps MacIntyre does not provide a legitimate critique of capitalism, but rather of capitalism as most people think of it, i.e. as an economy managed by the government. If so, his criticism may be well-placed.  It is laudable that MacIntyre attempts to acknowledge both the good and bad of, say, globalization, but I think his thinking would benefit from some more precise definitions. Of course it is possible MacIntyre is badly represented in this article, a potentiality I duly acknowledge. As presented in this article though, his cases are rather muddled.

–

[1] http://mises.org/daily/4707 and my response: http://apologiaproliterativita.blogspot.com/2010/09/response-to-economic-thought-in-ancient.html

See also:

• Common Objections to Capitalism [video lecture] by Art Carden
• Cooperation: How a Free Market Benefits Everyone by Jeffrey Tucker 
• Economics As Science: A Catholic Defense of the Free Market by Thomas E. Woods Jr.
• No, the Free Market Did Not Cause the Financial Crisis by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
• Bring Back the Guild System? by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
• The Empirical Case against Government Stimulus by Robert P. Murphy
• The History of Capitalism (excerpt) by Ludwig von Mises
• Why the Meltdown Should Have Surprised No One [video lecture] by Peter Schiff
• How A Marxist Sees the Crisis (a short observation) by Jeffrey Tucker
• The Meaning of Competition by Daniel Krawisz

Allan Bloom on Aristotle's Ethics

On teaching Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics.

Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V

Democracy and Culture

Earlier this week we looked at some issues surrounding democracy and government. Our look at some popular music also tended in the direction of looking at democracy but in the context of culture, a vantage from which Sven Wilson of Pileus [1] and Damon Linker of The New Republic have looked today. Before we begin we ought to make the distinction that we're looking at not just democracy but a specific blend of liberalism and democracy. By democratic we mean that the law is determined predominately by the will of the people and by liberal we mean that the law tends to favor liberty over other goals like stability, security, et cetera.

Let us begin with Mr. Linker's essay, which itself begins with a fine summary of liberalism and what is perhaps its most important feature: that it excludes certain discussions from the law. That is, there is no consensus on certain issues. For example, in the United States everyone is bound to an accord on, say, "the right to be free from unreasonable searches," but not on what is moral. Linker's example is perhaps even clearer: that we agree on a right to happiness, but not what that happiness is. There is no accord as to whether a commercial or contemplative life is best. Yet undoubtedly people have their own answers, of some sort, to those questions. Mr. Linker has neatly addressed the crucial point that liberalism considers liberty to be the greatest good. It sounds obvious of course but such has great implications: what you consider good is somehow or potentially subordinated to liberty. Of course you are free to pursue that good for yourself and are free to encourage others to follow your view too, but you cannot ensure the good. Of course liberalism by virtue of protecting one's life and property goes a long way toward promoting what most people consider the good, for example the right to your life. Nonetheless the problem is ineluctable as questions of morality and law continue to generate conflict because of lack of consensus on a metaphysical issue.

Now Mr. Wilson addresses a unique feature of democracy: the great variety of ideas. Plato called democracy a "bazaar of constitutions" (παντοπώλιον πολιτειῶν) [3] Now in the absence of consensus on certain things (a feature of liberalism, as we just noted) some of that variety is bound to be considered bad (let us permit this vague word in this instance.) Now Plato considered [4] there to be an anarchic element to democracy and also to the democratic man: that the proper (good) element in society and in him is not what holds sway. Where then does the good come from in a liberal democratic society?

Undoubtedly there will be some idea and ideas considered good or better than others, and those ideas will be consolidated into two places: institutions and idealized individuals. To preserve those two elements, and thus the good, what is needed? To preserve an institution some kind of conservative element must prevail, and since it is conserving what is thought to be the good we may call it aristocratic. We do not here inquire here about means, i.e. how the proper people are found and brought to perform the necessary conserving.

In this group we may class institutions of education, connected with holding public office, and of religion. All of these institutions affect what is thought to be good and try to bring about that good. What Aristotle said of education[5] implies in some respect to all of these institutions: they attempt to make a plurality into unity. Yet Aristotle also says that like a harmony passing into unison, a state may be too unified. This is an inquiry of its own: to what extent does a plurality and a atmosphere of challenging ideas promote the good? What ought to ground society: what it firmly believes to be good or a spirit of inquiry toward the truth? Such inquiry would inherently challenge the status quo at all times and be damaging to stability. Would it turn all truth into a potential provisional truth? Speaking of inquiry specifically philosophy, Nietzsche wrote, "if philosophy ever manifested itself as helpful, redeeming, or prophylactic, it was in a healthy culture. The sick, it made ever sicker." [6]

This is perplexing. We need both plurality and unity, we need stable institutions but the potential to correct potential mistakes. (Aristotle questioned the wisdom of fixing even bad laws, because what you gain in justice you may lose in stability because such changes weaken confidence in the constitution. [7])

Of institutions then we see that balance is the most prudent course, between extreme rigidity which may harbor injustice and extreme laxness which commands no authority. Of the people we see a need for a balance there too, between an aristocracy which may corrupt to on oligarchy and a populism which may devolve into extreme democracy.


Yet what of the "idealized individual" we spoke of? Of course in any society some people are thought well of. Aristotle wisely made the connection that "to praise a man is akin to urging a course of action" and which people a society chooses to praise, be they real or fiction, modern or ancient, is akin to extolling particular virtues and action. We may then say that leading a public and good life is necessary in a liberal democracy. It is not sufficient simply to extol virtues but people must see that they can be lived. Thus to retreat from public life is damaging for at least two reasons. First, what is bad is most often well-known if not outright sensationalized. I say well-known because it is not necessarily qualified. Thus not to make the good known is to give what is bad full or fuller sway. Second, it makes one question as to whether what is good is plausible to do. Even if someone thinks a particular trait is a virtue, if he doesn't know anyone who lives that way, is he likely to emulate that behavior? It is doubtful.

Of course we must realize that any society short of a tyranny, either a tyranny by one or by many, will permit some diversity. In any non-tyrannical society some things will be common and some private. Forcing the good on some will gradually lead to tyranny and not acknowledging the good will lead to a relativist anarchy. Promoting the good, then, relies in some measure on strictly cultural forces, what we might most generally call the varieties of expression. Those expressions will demonstrate the bounds, and values, of the society.

All of these features, though, tie tightly into the individual. It is with thoughts and questions about the nature of the citizen and individual with which we ought to end our considerations. The question of whether the good individual and the good citizen may be one and the same was too perceived by Aristotle. In Book III of the Politics [10] Aristotle said the virtue of the citizen was relative to the constitution of which he is a member. Thus unless all men of the state share in perfect goodness, i.e. if they agree in all respects what the good is, then the good citizen and good individual cannot perfectly coincide. Yet Aristotle also says the purpose of the state is twofold, not just to fit him for the good life but to do so satisfy his social instinct. So if man's social instinct is liberal in nature our paradox makes more sense. It is then understandable that, totalitarianism and tyranny being unnatural, the type of government we attempted to describe and whose features we tried to balance is not unfitting.

Lest we be thought too tidily to have solved this timeless problem, one ought to concede a difficulty: that of tying action to cause. Aristotle stated [112 that actions are due to seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, nature, appetite. How a society chooses to determine what action is caused by which of those causes will determine much.

–

[1] http://pileusblog.wordpress.com/2010/10/07/repulsive-picture-of-the-day/
[2] http://www.tnr.com/blog/damon-linker/77929/religion-in-centerless-society
[3] Republic VIII. 557d.
[4] Republic VIII. 558c.
[5] Politics II. 12263b.
[6] Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. s. 27
[8] Politics I. 1269a.
[9] Rhetoric II. 1367b.
[10] Politics III. 1276b.
[11] Politics III. 1278b
[12] Rhetoric III.1369a

Gravitas and Comitas

In a recent conference between your humble co bloggers I commented that a lack of seriousness in one's character and purpose is not admirable. Likewise an overwhelmingly somber character is not particularly healthy or satisfying for one's friends either. No one looks forward to the presence of the dour fellow, no matter his brilliance, who drags down an evening's pleasant badinage with his dilemmas. The remaining question of course is how to balance the two and the apparent dichotomy has fascinated, or plagued, man for ages, from the time of Greek tragic and comic theater and the contrasting personalities of Heraclitus and Democritus (the "happy philosopher" and the sad) to Milton's poems L'Allegro and Il Penseroso, in which he characterized and contrasted the happy man with the thoughtful man. Of course different movements and cultures had their ideals too but two of them to me seem particularly wise, and similar. 


The Romans contrasted the virtues of gravitas and levitas. Gravitas is the characteristic of man who understands the the importance of the matter at hand and in turn treats the matter with appropriate seriousness. Maintaining such a disposition requires stability of character (disciplina) and a firmness of purpose (constantia.) For example, one takes placing his vote seriously because he is aware of many aspects of it which are serious, the history of his nation and government, the fact he is delegating his natural right to someone else, the need to do good, and so forth. To treat it lightly is to treat it as if it is trivial and thus demeans it. Eventually, demeaning it will result in it. . . not having any meaning. Thus treating that which is serious with levity is in fact not just foolish but damaging. It is not levitas which ought to balance gravitas, but comitas, a general "good humor" and relief from the burden of seriousness. It does not exist for its own sake but in order that you may do what is necessary. Such a distinction is not too removed from us, wherein one used to speak of being "amused" or "diverted" by something, something which was appreciated for the relief it provided but not praised too much. Aristotle put this is in similar terms:

The happy life is thought to be virtuous; now a virtuous life requires exertion, and does not consist in amusement. And we say that serious things are better than laughable things and those connected with amusement, and that the activity of the better of any two things-whether it be two elements of our being or two men-is the more serious; but the activity of the better is ipso facto superior and more of the nature of happiness. [Ethics, X.vi; Trans. Ross]

Indeed the idea of "good humor" was up until recently fairly common. A little farther back, John Adams was quite fond of the turn of phrase and the ideal of the man of good manners, sound judgment, and balanced disposition that it connoted. "When a young New England merchant named Elkanah Watson, the son of a friend, wrote to inquire what sort of manners he should cultivate in anticipation of touring Europe, Adams's answer went far to explain his own conduct under the circumstances and the kind of guidance he was giving his sons."

You tell me, sir, you  wish to cultivate your manners before you  begin your travels. . . permit me to take the liberty of advising you to cultivate the manners of your own country, not those of Europe. I don't mean by this that you should put on a long face, never dance with the ladies, go to a play, or take a game of cards. But you may depend upon this, that the more decisively you adhere to a manly simplicity in your dress, equipage, and behavior, the more you devote yourself to business and study, and the less to dissipation and pleasure, the more you will recommend yourself to every man and woman in this country whose friendship or acquaintance is with your having or wishing. There is an urbanity without ostentation or extravagance which will succeed everywhere and at all times. You will excuse this freedom, on account of my friendship for your father and consequently for you, and because I know that some young gentlemen have come to Europe with different sentiments and have consequently injured the character of their country as well as their own bother [and at home]. [McCullough, 237]

Adams speaks of a balance, an "urbanity without ostentation" which seems most reasonable. The advice has a clear Roman sensibility, unsurprising given Adams' education and his knowledge of and respect for those ancient people. One ought to cultivate good sense and a manly simplicity, not let one's character be whittled down by activities which dissipate. Be serious, but do not offend with severity, be neither too easygoing or rude in sternness. Of course one ought to attend to his affairs and duties also. You'll be respected for when you abstain and when you retire from fun to attend to your private affairs you'll be well-thought of.

Of course achieving this requires time and experience, but it also requires one to know himself and where to draw the limits on all things. To perfect such a disposition you ought to pull it all off in your own idiom and with a congenial charm. Simple, no? No, it's a life's work of conscious effort, but when you're done so you might just be an old gentleman.

–

McCullough, David. John Adams. Simon and Schuster Paperbacks. New York. 2001.

A Response to "Economic Thought in Ancient Greece"

A Response to "Economic Thought in Ancient Greece" by Jesus Huerta de Soto.
Original article at the Mises Institute: http://mises.org/daily/4707

Precis of de Soto's article:

The intellectual odyssey that laid the foundations for Western civilization began in classical Greece. Unfortunately, Greek thinkers failed in their attempt to grasp the essential principles of the spontaneous market order.

This is a fine article and a very good look at the thought which separates 21st century economic thinking from that of the Classical world, the essence of which is the conception of spontaneous market order. Now I must as a Classicist admit I have more affection and respect for the parties in question, even when I [vociferously] disagree.

That said, there are a few points I would like to comment on. My intent is not to "correct" Mr. de Soto, but rather to expand upon various points of his since where Plato and Aristotle go awry, I believe they go awry in interesting and instructive ways. I have not been comprehensive here, but I hope I have provided some context and interesting questions.

N.B. This is a brief first and slightly off-the-cuff reaction to the article. I may add to or otherwise revise it in the near future, but I have posted it so soon toward the end of sharing it with more people by getting it out closer to the publication of the original article. Comments/corrections are still, of course, welcome.


Socrates

Now it is not hard to criticize Socrates and indeed his final self-defense did not endear him to the assembly. Nonetheless, and it seems odd to have to say this, but Socrates deserves some commendation. No matter how sympathetic you are to the charges of "corrupting the youth," the philosophizing and questioning Socrates was advocating were not yet in the air, let alone in the lifeblood of Western Civilization. Socrates was, really for the first time, widely presenting and disseminating it. Today we can pick up philosophy books, take classes, and freely and openly question just about anything. Now I do not only mean that we are free from compulsion or free from repression in the sense that we might be forcefully restrained from questioning. More important is that we know to question in the first place, and I think Socrates deserves a little credit for that.

As Socrates says in his defense, [I paraphrase] You bring me here for corrupting the youth. But who is more criminal: me, or you who pretend to be serious and to care for things which you never cared about at all?

Not all of the Greeks were amused, and in fact this summary from Wikipedia, intentionally or not, captures the hilarity of Aristophanes Clouds (Νεφέλαι):

Faced with legal action for non-payment of debts, Strepsiades, an elderly Athenian, enrolls his son in The Thinkery (the "Phrontisterion") so that he might learn the rhetorical skills necessary to defeat their creditors in court. The son thereby learns cynical disrespect for social mores and contempt for authority and he subsequently beats his father up during a domestic argument, in return for which Strepsiades sets The Thinkery on fire.

Aristophanes' description of the "Thinkery" or "Thinking Shop" (Clouds, 94)

ψυχῶν σοφῶν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ φροντιστήριον.
ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἐνοικοῦσ᾽ ἄνδρες, οἳ τὸν οὐρανὸν
λέγοντες ἀναπείθουσιν ὡς ἔστιν πνιγεύς,
κἄστιν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὗτος, ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἄνθρακες.
οὗτοι διδάσκουσ᾽, ἀργύριον ἤν τις διδῷ,
λέγοντα νικᾶν καὶ δίκαια κἄδικα.

Translation (Hickey) via Perseus Project:

This is a thinking-shop of wise spirits.
There dwell men who in speaking of the heavens
persuade people that it is an oven,
and that it encompasses us, and that we are the embers.
These men teach, if one give them money,
to conquer in speaking, right or wrong.

Socrates (up), Students (down), amidst studies. [1]

Of course it's all slightly less "funny" and more darkly ironic when you recall they did in fact poison him. Indeed Socrates mentions the unflattering and  false (he says) portrayal in his defense. [2] What was that line about being "remembered as the fools who killed Socrates?" Indeed.

Plato

Now clearly there is a lot in The Republic that. . . well, anyone would disagree with. I should point out Anders Mikkelsen' piece also at the Mises Institute, "The Politics of Plunder in Plato's Republic" [3] which offers the novel and interesting argument that "Plato's Republic is an exposition of the logical consequences of basing civic and personal life on injustice. It condemns political life based on institutionalized injustice — specifically theft and plunder." Let us then confine ourselves here to a few points.

de Soto writes

What is even worse is that Socrates's statolatry was so obsessive that it led him to confuse the positive law derived from the city-state with natural law. He believed people should obey all the positive laws derived from the state, even if they are contra naturam, and thus he laid the philosophical foundations for the legal positivism on which every tyranny to emerge after him in history would rest.

First, I don't know if "confusion" is the proper word. I believe the section in question is from the Crito (The Crito is quite short and the whole dialogue addresses this question.) Second, this is an excellent point I wish de Soto had delved into. Socrates' point seems particularly puzzling since he starts the dialogue by rebuking his old friend Criton for caring what other people think and then goes on to say one should obey unjust laws. I don't think one could argue the dialogue is very paternalistic and statist in tone. Most people would in fact find it off-putting. Socrates, having been convicted, imagines what the state would ask him if he tried to run away: [Translations, W.H.D. Rouse]

Tell me Socrates, what have you in mind to do? In trying to do this, can't you see that you are trying to destroy us, the Laws, and the whole state, as far as yo can do to it? Or do you think it possible that a city can exist and not be overturned, where sentence given has no force but is made null by private persons and destroyed. [Crito, 50b.]

Shortly later, the voice of the laws says, "you must either persuade [your country] or do what she commands; you must bear in quiet anything she bids you to bear" [Crito, 51b] Wow! That's certainly unambiguous and at the moment I can't imagine a more statist line. It reminds me of a quote from Theodore Roosevelt, "No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man's permission when we ask him to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor." Sort of makes you want to aim to misbehave, doesn't it?

Yet it would be dishonest to end the discussion here, as the voice of the laws goes on to make the case that Socrates, before he committed this crime, was a free resident of the city. That is, he could have left. Instead, he stayed and chose to be subject to the laws. This is in fact the third of the laws' three arguments, that the criminal does wrong against the state in three ways, 1) because the state is his parents, 2) because the state is his nurturer, and 3) because he was there voluntarily. Speaking of remaining in the city voluntarily, Socrates could have proposed banishment as his punishment. How does this affect his relationship to the laws and state? The situation is now more complicated: if Socrates liked Sparta so much and was free to leave, why didn't he? I don't find de Soto's encapsulation of Socrates' choice very enlightening, and not just because it is unflattering to the philosopher. It would seem worthwhile, though, to take all of Socrates' claims at face value; I think doing so would provide more interesting venues of explanation even if one disagrees.

It seems a perverse situation, perhaps it is just to follow unjust laws but unjust to carry out unjust laws? Is is not just to carry out any law, then? Clearly Socrates thought his situation was just here, and he was also concerned with justice (see the opening two books of the Republic, Republic (588b-592b,  (608c-end.)) I am not presently at liberty to discuss the sections in question as well as the remainder of the Apology, but my point is that it is more profitable to approach the apparent problem with Socrates' ideas by reducing them to the principles which generated them and not simply saying, "he said x which was wrong, y which was bad, et cetera.) Lastly regarding Plato, there is one seemingly very liberal quote I cannot verify or place:

Good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while bad people will find a way around the laws.

I'm not at all sure where this quote comes from, whether it is from the main canon of Plato or if it was found as a quotation in another author. It would seem to reflect the Hamiltonian notion that the need for government (for Hamilton a particular type of government [4]) was needed because of man's nature, or at least the "bad" inclinations of some." We might broadly say that "the only need for government is because of criminals." That sounds paradoxical since if there is no law there is no illegality, though we are presumably discussing natural law here. Similarly, Plato says education would reduce the need for laws. (Then again, he would only educate the guardians. Aristotle finds understandable fault with this in Politics I.vi. 1264a.)

Anyway, perhaps this question was better posed by Aristotle,

"The law has the power to command obedience only by habit, so that a readiness to change laws quickly enfeebles them." So when does one change them then? "Do not change the laws lightly; what you gain may be outweighed by what you lose in obedience." [Politics, II.vii. 1269a]

Clearly to us there is some perhaps unpleasant deference to the state. Again, the state seems to exist for its own sake.Yet we must remember a principle which runs throughout all of Aristotle, that "the whole precedes the part." Thus the state which evolves from the community which evolves from the family is just as legitimate as the family and the pairing of man and woman, which is natural and just (according to Aristotle) because it is of necessity.


We might say that both Aristotle and Socrates seem to say order is more important than liberty, but to say so we would have to consider their definitions of liberty. No one is pro chaos, even if he is against a coercive monopoly of law. As de Soto's phrase spontaneous market order suggests, faith in markets is neither faith in chaos or disorder nor love of disorder, but rather faith in spontaneously arising order. As de Soto quite properly says, the grasping of the spontaneity is truly the issue in discussing "ancient economics."


Prejudices Against Usury

de Soto understandably finds fault with some of the philosopher's positions on usury and money-making. Like Tibor Machan in his article from a few weeks ago [5], I think also and generally finds the philosophers just do not enough value the necessity of making a living.

Aristotle says, "Men want to increase their money without limit because they are intent upon living only, not living well." [Politics, I.ix. 1258a] Yet we must recall the Aristotelian principle that "that which is done for its own sake," that which is an end itself is more valuable. One does not work because he loves working, though he may love what he does, but because it is necessary to support himself. Yet if he plays a musical instrument or studies or takes up a hobby, those things are ends in themselves, done for no other purpose. [Nichomachean Ethics, I.i. 1094a]

Wealth is thus of value, but one must not understand things only in terms of their monetary value. [Rhetoric, II.xiii. 1389b.] One could of course translate that into an axiom more obviously "economic" but Aristotle's point is rather obvious.

Wealth-getting is a natural part of managing a household. Yet some people "turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must contribute. [Politics I.ix. 1258a]

Aristotle's censure of usury seems to me to be sensible even if you do not share it. Money, to Aristotle, was simply a stand in for work. You converted your work into coin so you could more easily trade it. Without money you could only barter; if you needed eggs but only had wine to trade, and the man with the eggs didn't want your wine, then you couldn't get eggs. Usury, in contrast, generates more money without adding any new product. There is more coin but the coin is, in this thinking, detached; it does not represent anything. The Greek word for interest, τόκος (tokos) is the same as the word for offspring, meaning that the money is born from money. Yet the disconnection from something of apparent and obvious value makes earning money via usury seem like a cheat.

In Politics, I.ix. 1258b Aristotle says such "wealth-getting" concerns are not "unworthy of philosophy" but rather they are illiberal. For various discussions of Aristotle and "liberality" see Recommended Reading below.



Aristotle on Property


On the one hand Aristotle does say common property would destroy liberality, and (humorously) that, "man will not simply become everyone's friend if property is made common." Certain evils, Aristotle says too, arise from man's nature, like perjury and breaking contracts (See Shuchman in Recommended Reading below.) Aristotle says property should be private, "How immeasurably greater is the pleasure when a man feels a thing to be his own" [Politics, II.v. 1263a.] but that its use should be common. See Swanson in Recommended Reading.

Regarding land and property, I think it is difficult for us in the 21st century with all of our technology to appreciate what seemed plausible in the past. Aristotle and Plato both thought there was an ideal size for a city. Jefferson writing in 1816 describing his system of wards and republicanism wrote:

Were I to assign to [republicanism] a precise and definite idea, I would say, purely and imply, it means a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority; and that every other government is more or less republican, in proportion as it has in its composition more  or less of this ingredient of the direct action of its citizens. Such a government is evidently restrained to very narrow limits of space and population. I doubt if it would be practicable beyond the extent of a New England township. The first shade from this pure element, which, like that of pure vital air, cannot sustain life of itself, would be where the powers of the government, being divided, should be exercised each by representatives chosen either pro hac vice, or for such short terms as should render secure the duty of expressing the will of their constituents. This I should consider as the nearest approach to a pure republic, which is practicable on a large scale of country or population. [6]

Conclusion

I hope I have pointed out some things of interest, built on some of de Soto's statements, and elucidated some of his quotations.

If I may make one point, though, it would be that the aims of Plato and Aristotle's states were not liberty. The greatest good for the state, for them, was predicated on the greatest good for man. The ideal state is what it is because of what the ideal man is. A liberal state does not pretend that it has a template for the ideal man or citizen, though clearly there is behavior incompatible with liberal-democratic-republican-capitalist society. As Plato says in Republic VIII 561-562, you will find many various "constitutions" to which you will be tempted in a democratic state. Risky indeed, but it beats "being ruled."

Similarly, though, we may ask: Is it legitimate to criticize these authors for making economic mistakes when they were not, properly speaking, considering economics? (i.e. The distinct discipline we know as Economics)



Notionally I appreciate this point but I wonder if the premise would permit fruitful inquiry: because Plato et al didn’t realize they weren’t writing about “economics” we can’t criticize them for being wrong about economics. It would seem not to if one considers economics an objective science. It would appear to be more productive  to take the statements of the philosophers in question in context because these “mistakes” of theirs were made for particular reasons, i.e. not having conceptions of “economics” and a spontaneous order, being consistent with principles stated elsewhere in their work, and working toward a different end. On the one hand we don’t want to pigeon-hole them into later conceptions, on the other we somehow must if we consider there to be a larger set of “true”/objective categories.

In addition to being more constructive and elucidating, perhaps such a discussion about “the why” of their “mistakes” would have tempered the tone of Prof. de Soto’s article and made certain people not bristle so much, particularly those inclined toward philosophizing. We must consider that Plato and Aristotle hold philosophizing itself in high esteem. For them, choosing to spend your free time reflecting on philosophy is a great good.


Overall, I think it is less useful to say, "Socrates, Plato, Aristotle et al" missed x, y, and z" or that "they were wrong about a, b, c et cetera" than to say, "Why wouldn't this have occurred to them?" and "Why did they think this was necessary?" For an important reason probably, and maybe a good one. How can we accomplish that goal by a different means?

–

[1] Plato attempts to reverse this caricature of Socrates (and philosophers) in Republic VII.529b-529c
[2] Plato. Apology of Socrates, 19c.
[3] Mikkelsen, Anders. The Politics of Plunder in Plato's Republic. http://mises.org/daily/4201
[4] Rosano, Michael J. Liberty, Nobility, Philanthropy, and Power in Alexander Hamilton's Conception of Human Nature. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 61-74
[5] Machan, Tibor R. A Problem with Aristotle's Ethical Essentialism. http://mises.org/daily/4458
[6] Letter to John Taylor. Monticello, May 28, 1816, M.E., XV, 19. in Koch, Adrienne. The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson. Columbia University Press, New York. 1957. p. 164

Recommended Reading

Long, Roderick T. Aristotle's Conception of Freedom. The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jun., 1996), pp. 775-802


McGrade, A. S. Aristotle's Place in the History of Natural Rights. The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jun., 1996), pp. 803-829


Mayhew, Robert. Aristotle on Property. The Review of Metaphysics.

Shuchman, Philip. Aristotle's Conception of Contract.  Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1962), pp. 257-264


Swanson, Judith A. Aristotle on Liberality: Its Relation to Justice and Its Public and Private Practice. Polity, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 3-23

Younkins, Edward W. Aristotle, Human Flourishing, and the Limited State. http://www.quebecoislibre.org/031122-11.htm